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SUMMARY
The aim of the Artificial Intelligence Humanities is to present humanistic suggestions for our 
lives and academia regarding how humans will live in a smart city surrounded by artificial 
intelligence technology. With that purpose in mind, we introduce the groundwork for the 
Artificial Intelligence Humanities and share our related concerns. As a concept, “Artificial 
Intelligence Humanities” comprises three elements: “artificial intelligence,” “content of 
the humanities,” and “methodology of the humanities.” The “content of the humanities,” 
comprises the derivatives of the traditional humanities, namely, linguistics, literature, history, 
ethics, sociology, and cultural studies. These five research areas, along with the discipline 
created through the traditional humanities’ acceptance of the changes brought by the age of 
intelligence, are derived by reflecting on oneself and the world, and they are applied to the 
world as it exists today in the age of artificial intelligence and the humanities.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence Humanities, content of the humanities, methodology of the 
humanities, Posthumanism.
1. Introduction
The goal of this paper is to propose a framework for the “Artificial Intelligence 
Humanities(AIH)”, an area of study that traces those significant changes in our life 
which occur due to the constant advancement of AI technology and aims to present 
a constructive image of human and society in the future AI era. Along with this 
framework, we shall attempt to pave the ways for active participation in technology 
development in order to prevent AI from threatening humanity. 
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In this paper, we shall first observe those key arguments of posthumanism, which are 
very closely associated with AI phenomena and advocate the negation and reform 
of the traditional humanities. Results of this observation, however, indicate that the 
core claims of posthumanism are in practice not quite different from those advocated 
by the traditional humanities. In other words, the results reveal that posthumanism 
tries only to reconfigure itself to accommodate the era of AI by positively accepting 
the achievement of the traditional humanities. Alternatively, we shall argue that 
AIH takes a path that can be clearly differentiated from that of posthumanism. AIH 
succeeds in that dichotomous attitude of making a sharp distinction between matter 
and form as well as between content and method, which has long been maintained 
since the time of Aristotle. According to this tradition, we understand AIH in 
two separate concepts, namely the content of AIH, which comprises its academic 
characteristic, and its method, which consists in its academic attitude. We shall 
argue that the content of AIH includes the principal branches of the traditional 
humanities, such as linguistics, history, culture, philosophy as general science which 
includes anthropology and psychology, ethics, sociology, and culturology, and that 
its method is a self-reflective attitude. We refer to the former as world-hermeneutics 
and the latter as the reflective character of humanities. When the focus of reflection 
in the humanities is on the present-world, AI is absorbed into the above disciplines 
of the humanities, and is restructured and referenced as AI Technology Criticism, AI 
Relationships and Communication Studies, AI Socio-Cultural Studies, AI Ethics, 
and AI Data Hermeneutics.
 
2. Humanistic Characteristics hidden in the Posthumanism 
N. Bostrom, who established the World Transhumanist Association and leads 
posthumanistic discourses nowadays, firmly states that progress in technology can 
enable the advent of posthumans and must do so. As with all others, because the 
discourse on posthumanism has been varied and developed widely, it is difficult to 
devise a partial definition of it at this point. But this theory undoubtedly begins with 
the premise that the traditional concept of human that was constructed following 
the Renaissance must be subjected to some modifications. A brief definition of 
posthumanism based on existing theories may be suggested as follows.
Posthumanism is based on the premise that all kinds of dichotomy are violent 
illusions that must be dismantled, and narrowly dismantles the dualistic 
opposition of the body and mind, and breaks the boundaries between “material 
and non-material, animal and human, and even organism and machine”2 to 
2  Haraway, Donna (1995). in Wolfe, 36. Quoted from Posthumanism, 190. 
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dismantle “dual confrontation between human and non-human”3. From this 
perspective, it seeks to create and develop posthumans who overcome the 
limitations of the biological form using the achievements of biotechnology 
and artificial intelligence
As predicted by the fact that posthumanism shares a prefix with postmodernism, 
which emerged from the philosophical discussion of repetition of ‘action and 
reaction’, it was raised from the ideological soil of postmodernism. Many scholars, 
including S. Herbrechter, S. Sorgner, state that the philosophical starting point of 
posthumanism is the philosophy of Nietzsche, a pioneer of postmodernism.4 
Humans of the future rescue us from past reason. We are rescued from the 
inevitability to grow further, in other words, intense regurgitation, intent to 
head towards futility, and nihilism. The bell of correction and great resolution 
frees our will again and returns objectives to the earth and hope to humans. 
Antichrist, anti-nihilist, and those that overcome god and nihilism will 
inevitably appear...5 
Some traces of Nietzsche’s philosophy on the ‘Waiting for Übermensch’ still remain 
in the modern spirit: “The noble ideal itself has become incarnated” and “the 
synthesis of Unmensch and Übermensch is Napoleon.”6 The radical criticism of 
humanity (human beings) tacitly assumes a better us. The desire to reject oneself 
and create a better self always depends on the awareness of the self. Self-perfection 
through self-negation is a transformational imitation of the progressive ideas of 
the Enlightenment. This negative-positive ambivalence appears more distinctly as 
the self-destructive nature of posthumanism appears stronger. Let us now examine 
the arguments of transhumanism, which attempt to present a certain blueprint for 
maximizing human happiness through the denial of common sense concerning the 
concept of a human being. 
N. Bostrom defines it as “intellectual and cultural movements affirming the 
possibility and desirability of fundamentally improving human conditions by 
developing and expanding technologies that eliminate human aging and improve 
3  Badmington, Neil (2010). Pod Almighty!; Or, Humanism, Posthumanism, and Strange Case of Invasion of the 
Body Snatchers, Textual Practice, 15 (1), 5-22.
4  See Herbrechter, Stefan. (2012). 31. See Sorgner, (2009) Nietzsche, the Overhuman, and Transhumanism, 
Journal of Evolution & Technology, 20 (1), 29-42. Volume 20 of the Journal of Evolution & Technology, an academic 
journal on modern technology ethics discourse, was a special volume on Nietzsche’s effects on transhumanism. 
On the contrary, Bostrom stated that Nietzsche’s Übermensch concept has only “surface-level similarities” with 
transhumanism and reduced its effect. Bostrom, Nick (2005). A history of transhumanist thought, Journal of 
Evolution & Technology, 14 (1), 4 4, https://nickbostrom.com/papers/history.pdf
5  Nietzsche, Friedrich (1906), Zur Genealogie der Moral in: Nietzsche’s Werke B. VIII, Leipzig; C. G. Naumann 
Verlag, 476.
6  Ibid., 337.
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the intellectual, physical, and psychological abilities of humans.”7 Transhumanism 
supports the enhancement of the human condition through physical prosthesis and 
orthoses, based on the needlessness of the boundary between the machine and the 
biological body. In this regard, transhumanists also pursue disembodiment through 
the uploading of one’s consciousness. However, if we contemplate this idea in reverse, 
it can be said to follow the modern idea of the mind-body dichotomy. In fact, 
although the blueprint of the future society proposed by Bostrom is the same as that 
described above, his diagnosis of reality is truly realistic. In his view, “Some authors 
write as though simply by changing our self-conception, we have become or could 
become posthuman. This is a confusion or corruption of the original meaning of the 
term. The changes required to make us posthuman are too profound to be achievable 
by merely altering some aspect of psychological theory or the way we think about 
ourselves. Radical technological modifications to our brains and bodies are needed.”8 
As Bostrom clearly states that “transhumanism, (which pursues the fulfillment of the 
ideal of posthuman: add. From Kim), can be viewed as an extension of humanism, 
from which it is partially derived”9. While the autonomy of the individuals can be 
taken as a concept perfecting the modern spirit and is indeed the highest value of 
that spirit, the combination of AI and interface technology produces a tool that may 
be used to this end.10 In this way, posthumanism, which is based on anti-humanism, 
returns to humanism as it shows its true colors. Although those “humans of the 
future” of which posthumanism speaks may not be “us,” they are still human. And 
although posthumanism is not the humanism of the past, it is still a humanism. 
In the next chapter, we will argue that artificial intelligence humanities shares many 
resemblances with posthumanism. However, there are crucial differences, as follows:
The posthumanism, which is actually strongly baptized by humanism, 
advocates anti-humanism. However, on the other hand, AIH embraces the 
achievements and traditions of humanistic traditional humanities. And it 
makes social and cultural phenomena due to artificial intelligence the objects 
for its academic discussions.
7  Bostrom, Nick (2003). The transhumanist FAQ. In Bostrom, N, Nick Bostrom’s Home Page, https://www.
nickbostrom.com/views/transhumanist.pdf, (accessed: 3 July 2019).
8  Ibid.
9  Ibid.
10  See. Ibid.
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3. Contents and Methodology of AIH 
Firstly, once we attempt a simple analysis of the words AIH, two components are 
drawn: “artificial intelligence” and “humanities.” Secondly, “artificial intelligence” 
is regarded as an object confronting the “Humanities,” which is the reflective 
inquiry into the era. Finally, we employ the dichotomous attitude of the traditional 
humanities, which began with Aristotle, and again divide the elements that 
constitute the humanities into two kinds. Specifically, by means of an analysis of the 
academic attitude throughout the whole period of the modern Western humanism, 
during which the academic questioning of the humanities became full-scale and 
subsequently intensified, the content of the humanities is separated from its method; 
as such, the contents of the humanities discipline are defined as world-hermeneutics 
and its method as reflection. Artificial intelligence has three components: “artificial 
intelligence, world-hermeneutics, and the reflective character of humanities.”
 
3.1 Deduction of Contents of AIH 
It is common to refer to “Studia Humanitas,” which is known to be first used by 
Cicero, as the origin of today’s commonly used word “humanities.” When it was 
first uttered, Humanitas meant “Favorable human behavior patterns (habits).” 
In this context, it may also be noted that it was he who first introduced the term 
‘philosophia moralis”, which will be dealt with later.11  Here it was dissolved in 
ancient Greek traditions to view Humanitas as a virtue(arete) of a liberal, that 
is, “someone who can use Logos.” In fact, that discipline inherited the essence of 
paideia, which takes teaching humanity and excellence as its objectives. Simply put, 
“Studia Humanitas” is a Latin translation of the Greek word “paideia”.12 The latter 
word was often taken to be synonymous with culture and education. Considering 
that these two words of the latter have a similar meaning in the Greek tradition, 
we can understand ‘paideia’ as the meaning of ‘self-cultivation’ to improve human-
virtue.13 Cicero defined it as “a term that includes all liberal arts, in other words, 
topics appropriate for the education of free people.” This became the root of the 
11  Conze, Werner and Koselleck, Reinhart eds., (1982), Menschheit, Humanität, Humanismus in Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe: Historischers Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, Bd. 3, Stuttgart; Klett-Cotta, 
1064. Cicero coined the word philosophia moralis as a translation of the Greek word ἠθική(ēthikós). Mos (or 
Morse) is the root word of the moralis. Ethik, Moral, and Sitten in modern German have the same etymology 
with Humanitas, which means “the Favorable Human behavior patterns” mentioned in the text. See Diemer, 
Alwin, Historische Wörterbuch der Philosophie online. (https://www.schwabeonline.ch/schwabe-xaveropp/
elibrary/start.xav#__elibrary__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27verw.moral.moralisch.moralphilosophie%27
%5D__1585115242588) 
12 However, regarding the approach that the meaning of humanitas does not necessarily coincide with paideia, 
see Conze, Werner and Koselleck, Reinhart, eds., (1982), 1066. 
13  See Jaeger, Werner (1973). PAIDEIA, Berlin; De Gruyter, 6, 384. 
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seven preliminary learnings: Trivium, which includes grammar, logic, and rhetoric, 
and Quadrivium, which includes geometry, algebra, astronomy, and harmonics. In 
the Middle Ages, Trivium was applied in the teaching of theology and philosophy. 
However, medieval philosophy could not serve as anything more than an explanatory 
instrument for theology. In this sense, Trivium, which can be narrowly defined as a 
medieval version of the humanities, was used in a negative sense. As living beings, 
humans must seek Studia Divinitatis, the study of the divine, while humanitas was 
regarded as something that should be denied. Thus, trivium became trivial, and 
humanitas came only to concern something corporeal (Fleischliches). However, as 
is commonly known, the humanities revived the spirit of the ancient humanitas 
during the Renaissance and established itself as a field of study. It comprehended 
literature, grammar, moral philosophy, linguistics and rhetoric, poetics, history, and 
politics, and became a principal source upon which a great portion of the university 
curricula is now based.14 Over time, the ideology of human progress, which appeared 
as a reaction to the absolute pursuit of divinity, gradually evolved into the pursuit of 
the “good present world”, which moved humanities’ focus towards practicality.15 As 
this tradition was continued, practical anthropology was settled, for instance, by I. 
Kant in the eighteenth century as a part of moral philosophy.16 According to him, 
anthropology should be regarded as an area of humanities. 
Meanwhile, as medicine and architecture were excluded from the nine liberal arts 
in ancient Rome, the seven subjects survived in the medieval colleges; of these, 
grammar, rhetoric, and logic became trivium. Some disciplines have been added 
since then, and history and process analogous to the modern re-establishment of 
the humanities continue to take place today. In the German tradition, Humanitas 
is translated into mental science (Geistwissenschaft(en)). This came from J. Schiel’s 
translation of J. S. Mill’s Moral Science, according to the testimony of a well-
known modern philosopher, W. Dilthey. However, when traced to its origin, the 
first instance of the word appeared in the 18th century. This concept is referenced 
as being distinct from the study of God in the paper “Wer sind die Aufklärer?,” 
which was published anonymously. At that time, it was part of the Weltweisheit, 
and was used as a synonym for philosophy; it comprised rationalism, naturalism, 
law, and politics. In the early 19th century, E. A. E. Calinich later published a book 
entitled “The Method of Natural Science and Mental Science.” At this point in time, 
14  See Kimball, Bruce A. (1986). Orators & Philosophers: A History of the Idea of Liberal Education, New York; 
Teachers College Press, 78, and Hiorth, Finngeir (1996) Humanismus – Genau Betrachtet, Neu-Isenburg; Angelika 
Lenz Verlag, 57.
15  Grafton, Anthony and Jardine, Lisa (1986). From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts 
in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth Century Europe, Cambridge; Harvard University Press.
16  See Kant, Immanuel (1900). Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten(AA4) in: Kants gesammelte Schriften 
(Sog. Akademie-Ausgabe), Berlin; Walter de Gruyter, 388.
Chankyu Lee, Hyeongjoo Kim: Groundwork of Artificial Intelligence Humanities  pp. 189 – 207
195
the distinction between the two made by Dilthey was fixed, and natural science 
was naturally excluded from the scope of mental science. However, as Goethe said, 
“it has already been a century since liberal humanity has no longer moved human 
feelings;” the humanities tends to be positivist, in that all actions and emotional 
behaviors of humans can be reduced to physical and physiological realities by the 
influence of the newly developed natural sciences. This movement continues to this 
day, and the posthumanism discussed above is also under its influence. Moreover, 
as N. Hartmann’s work in the 20th century can be applied here, sociology has also 
fallen into the realm of the humanities through the introduction of the term, “social 
psychology” in Marxian philosophy.17 In addition, rational psychology, which was a 
part of metaphysics along with cosmology and theology since Christian Wolf ’s time, 
was established as an essential part of philosophy by I. Kant. W. Wundt critically 
inherited this tradition in the name of experimental psychology. In this process, 
psychology was separated from philosophy. Although it may be conceived as social 
science in that it performs empirical research through objective experimentation. 
However, it can still be taken as an area of humanities in that its subject-matter 
is human psychology and spirit. Thus we regard psychology here as an area of 
humanities.
The history of the humanities is like a game of alternating between self-determination 
and self-denial. For example, Heidegger reads the death of God described by Nietzsche 
as the end of metaphysics. Foucault emphasizes “the end of man” in The Order of 
Things. E. Cassirer assessed Kant, who is commonly argued as having perfected 
the enlightenment, as a destructor of metaphysics. It is not radical or new to state 
that post-humanism, which is alleged to represent the humanities in the era of AI, 
claims to support the birth of a completely new discipline that denies its ideological 
foundation. This is in line with the slogan and legacy used throughout the history 
of the humanities. In Section 2, we have analyzed the essence of posthumanism, 
which has been developed by means of abolishing the traditional disciplines of the 
humanities and argued that it nevertheless maintains the essence of the traditional 
humanities. AIH positively embraces the spirit of the traditional humanities but 
takes a different path that posthumanism has followed. Therefore, AIH suggests that 
the existing disciplines of the humanities that we extracted above, such as linguistics, 
literature, history, ethics, sociology, anthropology, and psychology are its essential 
contents that should put on a new outfit in order to prevent themselves from 
being discarded with the spread of AI. The grounds for this new appearance and 
reinterpretation of the humanities can be found in the reflective attitude, which is a 
17  Diemer Alwin, Historische Wörterbuch der Philosophie online. (https://www.schwabeonline.ch/ schwabe-
xaveropp/elibrary/start.xav?start=%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27verw.geisteswissenschaften%27%5D#__
elibrary__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27verw.geisteswissenschaften%27%5D__1550933851671).
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symbol of modernity. If the humanities target the era, with which it is confronted, 
as a subject for reflection, it will reconstruct itself as a result. In this sense, the study 
of AI has a trait that allows the humanities to reconstruct itself in keeping with the 
era of AI. 
3.2 Methodology of AIH
The Cogito proposition of R. Descartes, who wide opened the door to modern trends 
of thought, is still doing its “attractive magic”18 in the Western history of thought. 
Human beings and other living beings called nature.19 This took a monumental 
legacy of ancient philosophy—that is, the distinction between form(eidos) and 
matter(hyle) from Aristoteles20—as its nourishment and developed it into that 
methodological division of form and content, which is the foundation of modern 
academic construction. Remaining true to this tradition, we cite Kant as a philosopher 
committed to completing the humanities spirit in the age of Enlightenment.21 For 
example, in Grundlegung zur Metaphsysik der Sitten, in order to build a new discipline 
called “moral metaphysics,” he brought in natural science, ethics (moral philosophy), 
and logic which are three areas of research in ancient Greek philosophy22, and by 
introducing the diagram of content and form into these areas, logic is divided into 
pure formal learning (natural science and ethics) and thereby becomes a discipline 
containing empirical elements. In other words, the application of the form-content 
diagram to ethics established “practical philosophy,” which includes anthropology and 
extracts “moral metaphysics” from purely formal ethics.23 By applying this attitude, 
we can reinforce the universal value of the research areas constituting the essential 
content of the humanities. In the question “what is learning?,” the focus is laid on the 
“attitude of reflection,” the foundational principle of academic work, according to 
Fichte, a self-styled faithful successor of Kant, who was preoccupied with the work of 
building a foundation for learning. His initial works, including Ueber den Begriff der 
Wissenschaftslehre, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, etc.,24 are an attempt 
18  Brands, Hartmut (1982). Cogito ergo sum, Karl Alber, Freiburg, 10.
19  More detail, see Aristotle (1954). The Works of Aristotle v. VIII Metaphisica (trans. from Ross), the Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 980a-981bb.
20  Aristotle introduces shape and material to explain substance as a substratum. It can be described in three 
different ways, namely matter, form, or a compound of them. In the process of argument, he points out the 
incorrectness of the view that substance is made up only of matter and implicitly supports the view that it is a 
compound of matter and form. As can be seen here, the dichotomy of form and matter becomes increasingly 
apparent as he reaches the conclusion of his argument. See Ibid., 1027b-1029b.
21  See Wundt, Mohr (1945). die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung, Tübingen; Olms, 1.
22  The fact that these three disciplines were a solid branch of Greek philosophy can be found in Heidegger’s book, 
“Über den Humanismus” as well; Heidegger, M. (2000) Über den Humanismus, Klostermann, 8.
23  See Kant, Immanuel (1900)., 387-390.
24  Hereinafter will be referenced as UBW and GLW, respectively. 
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to justify the principle of self-reflection represented by the catchphrase “I am I” (Ich 
bin Ich). We take this principle of reflection as the methodology for establishing the 
concept of AIH. 
Investigating the question “what is science and what conditions must it contain,” 
Fichte suggested “I am” as its first absolute condition. He performed an inquiry into 
the fundamental and self-fulfilling conditions of science, and the principle he found 
was more commonsensical than it might appear at first. Similarly to the mindset 
that every being in the world depends for its existence on another being, he asserted 
that “one academic discipline has a systematic format and all the propositions that 
comprise it relate to one fundamental proposition.”25 Individual sciences, each of 
which has its own underlying proposition, depend on one another. In the end, 
Fichte’s concern may be reduced to the science of science, i.e., the determination of 
its essence. Furthermore, it boils down to identifying the fundamental proposition 
that supports learning at its most basic level. He said at last that this fundamental 
proposition is “a clear proposition independently from it prior to the various 
dependencies it has,”26 and that as a study of the learning in general, “the theory of 
learning is based on logic, a purely formal study.”27 
Based on this premise, he emphasized the principle of identity, the first proposition 
of logic, and the fundamental principle of all thoughts. Suggesting, for example, that 
the signification layer of the principle of identity “A is A” does not lie in either “A” 
or “there is A,” but in the conditional sentence “if there is A, there is A,” Fichte took 
note of the necessary relation between the antecedent and the consequent of this 
conditional statement. He then referred to the necessity of this relationship as X, and 
deduced that as long as the judge is the self, this necessity should at least be given 
within “me.” In “A is A,” then, the former A and the latter A have a necessary relation 
through X, and this relation is expressed by: “if A is established within the I, A is 
established.”28 If A is established in the I, A has been derived from the establishment 
25  Fichte, Gottlieb W. (1971a), UBW in: Fichtes Werk I, Berlin; Walter du Gruyter, 38; “A science has systematic 
form. All propositions in it are connected in one single fundamental proposition” (Fichte, Gottlieb W. (1889a), 
Introduction: Concerning the conception of the science of knowledge generally, in: The Science of Knowledge, 
Kroeger, A.E trs., London; Trübner & Co,.Ludgate Hill, 58.)
26  See Ibid., 41; “Such a proposition, which has certainty before and independent of all connection, is a 
fundamental principle. Every science must have a fundamental principle; nay, it might consist of simply such 
one principle, which in that case could not be called fundamental, however, since it would not be the foundation 
of others. But a science also cannot have more than one fundamental principle, for else it would result in many 
sciences” (Fichte, G.W. (1889a). 62.)
27  Ibid., 46; “From this results the determined relation of logic to the science of knowledge” (Fichte, G.W. 
(1889a). 46.)
28  Fichte, Gottlieb W. (1971b). GLW in: Fichtes Werk I, Berlin; Walter de Gruyter, 91; “If A is posited in the 
Ego, then it is posited, or then it is.”(Fichte, Gottlieb W., (1889b). Fundamental principles of the whole science of 
knowledge, in: The Science of Knowledge, Kroeger, A.E, trs., London; Trübner & Co,.Ludgate Hill, 67.)
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of the proposition that “A exists for itself in the I general through the establishment 
of the I that judges,” and this gives rise to the proposition “I am I.” Further, “I am” 
is implied in “I am I.” This “I am” is the “first definitive unfounded fundamental 
proposition” of all sciences.29 
It may be noticed at a glance that this conditional proposition, which is inferred 
from the principle of identity (A=A), a fundamental principle of thought, as well 
as the proposition “I am,” is originated from the famous proposition by Descartes, 
“I think, therefore I am.”30 In short, “I am” is Fichte’s interpretation of Descartes’s 
thesis. Descartes’s statement features two different Is: the former “I” is the subject of 
“thought” and the latter “I” the object of thought. In other words, the “I” in “I think” 
is the subject of thought, and “I” in “I exist” is the “thought of I.” Also, because 
these two sentences are linked by the connective “ergo,” they are combined by the 
relationship of cause and effect. In other words, the self ’s ability to think is the cause 
of the self ’s existence. In yet another word, the former is a necessary condition for the 
latter. However, Fichte, who considered “I am” to be the fundamental proposition of 
academic theory, tried to reverse Descartes’s argument. His argument can be summed 
up as “I am, therefore, I think.” Seen in this light, “thought” is a special characteristic 
that I, who exists, has.”31 From this premise, “I am therefore I am” is derived, and 
since “The I in the former and the I in the latter significance are to be absolutely 
equal,”32 the final conclusion must be “I am I.” 
AIH focuses on the reflective attitude of this nature. We have previously argued 
that linguistics, literature, history, philosophy, ethics, sociology, and cultural studies, 
anthropology, psychology are still viable in the era of AI that is represented by the term 
“posthumanism.” If you apply the principle of self-reflection, the reflective character 
of humanities as a method for establishing an academic foundation may be said to be 
an exploration of the essence and function of the humanities. However, this is only a 
reflection on the existing fields of humanities research but is still insufficient in view 
of the research objective of establishing AIH with a new matter of “AI.” Although 
Fichte’s proposition “I am I” is based on the principle of thorough reflection, the 
range of reflection is still limited to one entity and is not commodious enough to 
29  Ibid., 91; “the absolute, first, and unconditioned fundamental principle of human knowledge”(Fichte, G.W, 
(1889b). 63.)
30  See Ibid., 99; “we thus obtain as a fundamental principle of logic the proposition A=A, which can only be 
proven and determined through the science of knowledge. Proven: for A is A because the Ego, which has posited 
that A is the same as the Ego in which A is posited. Determined: for whatever is, is only in so far as it is posited in 
the Ego, and there is nothing outside of the Ego” (Fichte, G.W, (1889b). 72.)
31  See Ibid., 100; “Thinking is not the essence, but merely a particular determination of the Ego” (Fichte, G.W, 
(1889b). 73.) 
32  Ibid., 96; “The Ego in the former and the Ego in the latter significance are to be absolutely equal”(Fichte, 
G.W., (1889b). 69.)
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establish a new humanities department that extends beyond the range of I and learns 
about the present world. Therefore, let us take that attitude of reflection only as 
the principle of academic establishment which followed from Descartes, and then 
concentrate on the position of interpreting the Cartesian reflection from a different 
perspective. 
Concerning Fichte’s attention to the Cartesian reflection, Kant offers a similar yet 
different interpretation. Descartes’ argument is incomplete in many ways, according 
to Kant. First, “I think therefore I am” is incomplete in form because it lacks such 
a major premise as “everything that thinks exists.” Second, even if we deliberately 
supplement this premise, this I that derives its existence from its thinking is an isolated 
I who can only dwell on its thoughts, in Kant’s view. Behind this idea lies Kant’s 
unique interpretation of Descartes’s thesis, “I think.” According to Kant, Descartes’ 
“I think” is an incomplete sentence, as in “I claim”, from which the object is absent. 
It is possible for “I” to take the place of this object to form a sentence like “I think 
of I,” but then the meaning would be no different from that of Fichte’s subjective 
idealism. Kant also regarded the latter, as an incomplete sentence because the object of 
one’s thinking must always be outside one’s consciousness. In the place of the object, 
there must be an empirical I that perceives the world and not an empty reflection 
only of the thinking I itself without real content.33 Now, the reflection extends to 
the living world we are facing here and now, not to consciousness alone. Applied 
to our study, the reflection on the relation between the world and the humanities 
that we experience is derived as a fundamental proposition for the groundwork of 
science. This opens the way for “AI,” the first component of the “AIH,” to enter into 
the scope of our discussion. The subject of AIH is the humanities, and the object 
experienced by the subject is artificial intelligence. Humanities, the subject of AIH, 
always performs self-reflection to clearly recognize its permanent existence, while 
trying to redefine its transforming shape through its relationship with AI, which is 
already related to the subject of its own experience.
4. The System of AIH 
First, as the Humanities is a study of reflection when the point of reflection is directed 
inwardly or toward oneself, it constantly repeats its proper role. As such, we have 
argued that the innate power in the humanities, which can maintain its essential 
content while reconfiguring itself in keeping with the changing times, lies in its 
reflective ability. As mentioned previously, this backs up the claim that the contents 
33  See Kim, Hyeongjoo (2016). Zur Empirizität des “Ich denke” in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Könighausen 
& Neumann, 136f. 
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of the traditional humanities are still valuable today. Second, if the scope of reflection 
is directed at the inner changes that occur when the humanities exposes itself to the 
world it confronts today, the road to “humanistic reflection on AI” will be opened. 
Based on the above, the process which AIH conforms to establish itself is as follows.
Stage 1: Contents of “AIH:” Artificial intelligence.
Stage 2:  Contents of “humanities” - humanities as world-hermeneutics: 
Linguistics, literature, history, anthropology, psychology, ethics, 
sociology, and cultural studies. Method of “humanities” - humanities 
as world-hermeneutics: Self-establishment of linguistics, literature, 
history, anthropology, psychology, ethics, sociology, and cultural 
studies.
Stage 3:  Method of AIH - Humanistic reflection on “artificial intelligence”.
Stage 4:  Contents of “AIH:” Linguistics, literature, history, philosophy 
(anthropology, psychology), ethics, sociology, and culturology with 
artificial intelligence as the object of reflection. 
As seen above, AIH has been analyzed and managed based on the framework of 
content, and form, and object and method. It pulls off a reform by which it can 
cope with a recently developed scientific object, namely “artificial intelligence,” while 
retaining as its own content such essential disciplines of the traditional humanities 
as linguistics, literature, history, philosophy, ethics, sociology, and culturology. The 
research scope of AIH reveals both aspects of self-preservation and self-renewal. 
First, as AI Technology Criticism, we classify those studies of literature and history-
oriented humanities that target AI. The unique humanistic imagination of literature 
is now steering the posthumanistic discourse. AI-themed sci-fi movies are also part of 
the work of advanced literature. It should be among the main tasks of contemporary 
literature to project the self-image created by us into the description of superhumans 
and non- or semi-humans, to present a new picture of society upon the emergence of 
those beings, and to depict the inner world of biological humans faced with them. The 
automaton (automated machine) Talos, featured in Greek mythology, Frankenstein, 
the epitome of “scientific myths,” and many AI characters that appeared in the 
recently released films are all potential reality based on the literary imagination. In 
addition to the micro-history centered on the histories of persons, times, and regions, 
now an integrated study of history starts to raise certain serious questions concerning 
the status of the human species in nature, as exemplified by the Big History. Similar 
to historical speculation about prehistory, the future of AI also constitutes an axis 
of historical research. By providing this humanistic imagination with a ground for 
realistic reflection on the very nature of technology and a positivistic analysis of AI 
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technology, AI Technology Criticism strives to attach the weight of “realistic” to the 
“literature work and historical speculation as a likely story.” 
In this regard, much research must first be carried out first on the characteristics of 
technological development according to human nature in the age of AI and on the 
change patterns in human nature that might be brought about by AI technology. 
To this end, while performing an analysis of the history of AI development and 
attempting to disclose the essence of human intelligence that cannot be replaced by 
machines, the possibility of AI technology at a cultural aspect that extends beyond 
the frame of industrial production should be examined. And then a due inquiry 
into the possibilities of a super-intelligence era and technological research for the 
preservation of human dignity34 must be made if the era does arrive. 
Second, a humanistic study centered on linguistics that targets AI is termed as AI 
Relationships & Communication Studies. It also investigates the reestablishment of 
relationships among all entities in the world and mode change in communication 
among them, which are highly likely to occur owing to the emergence and 
development of AI. As described in the previous chapter, the predominance of 
Descartes’ Cogito determines the direction of our understanding of human nature, as 
well as the metaphysical status of humans. If its influence grows, the status of humans 
in nature ascends, and the existential characteristic of humans defined by reason, 
and consciousness becomes more determinate. In the opposite case, the distinction 
between humans and non-humans becomes faint, and reason and consciousness will 
be considered no more as the essence of human nature. While the Cartesian Cogito 
forms the basis of foundationalist humanism, posthumanism views it as the main 
culprit needed to be dismantled.35 
AI Relationships and Communication Studies diagnose first the possibility of a 
universal grammar relying on foundationalism, the ultimate aporia of linguistics. 
Such an attempt can be made possible because of the development of AI technology 
aggregating a huge amount of data. We make use of these data to ascertain the 
theoretical possibility of constructing a universal grammar and language typology. 
Second, it searches for an appropriate communication model for each channel, 
noting the relationships resulting from the development of AI technology and the 
34  Discussion about human dignity in the age of artificial intelligence expands its area beyond the end-
means relationship among humans to the relationship between artificial intelligence and humans. We regard 
the preservation of self-objectivity as an important criterion for securing human dignity in the age of artificial 
intelligence, as shown in the second form of Kant’s categorical imperative. “Act so that you use humanity, as much 
in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means.” 
See Kant, I. (1900), 429.
35  For the discussion on the relationship between the deductive system of universal grammar and consciousness, 
see Chomsky, Noam (2009). Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought, Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press. 
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diversification of communication channels. The emergence of chatbots, for example, 
has rendered it no longer possible to dismiss computer messengers as “messengers” 
just for human-to-human communication. If we recognize the companion robot or 
chatbot as a communication player, the geography comprised of the innumerable 
channels of communication and relationships will change dramatically. The channels 
of communication will be multiplied from human-to-human communication to 
human-to-machine. Furthermore, the communication models of humans who are 
accustomed to communicating with machines will also be an important subject. 
For example, to examine the emotional communication between humans and AI, 
research has been conducted on the output sensitivity of AI and the patterns of 
human interaction; and to explore the communication between AI and human, 
studies will be conducted on the status and future of our language acquisition and 
automatic translation using the deep learning method, as well as the possibility of 
communication among AI’s themselves. This is accompanied by a genealogical study 
on the changes in the identity of communication subject according to the changes of 
the communication method. 
The third research domain of AIH is AI Socio-Cultural Studies. The discipline of AI 
Socio-Cultural Studies analyzes social and cultural phenomena that arise due to the 
emergence of AI and reviews its effects and issues related to the current social culture. 
As AI advances, whereas the focus of AI Technology Criticism is placed on the changes 
in the personality of the individual subject, AI Socio-Cultural Studies attempt to 
form a discourse from a macroscopic perspective regarding the patterns of change in 
individual cultures, social structures, groups, and systems, in addition to maintaining 
an open forum of discussion on comparative technology. To this end, first, relying 
on the research on the differences between the changes in segmented social sectors 
prompted by AI and those changes brought in by the previous industrial revolution, 
we seek to find new research methods that can address the issues of society and 
culture following the universalization and commercialization of AI technologies. If 
the emergence and commercialization of sex robots can reveal changes in the internal 
and behavioral patterns of individuals as sexual actors through Technology Criticism, 
Socio-Cultural Studies predict the resulting changes in the relationship between men 
and women, family relationships and concepts, and further changes and cultural 
conflicts between those who can own and produce the technology capital and those 
who cannot. Accordingly, we then accumulate basic data on the human response 
to the negative consequences of changes in society and culture in the age of AI and 
examine some methods for preserving dignity. This study leads to the fourth area of 
research, which is AI Ethics.
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 AI Ethics, in conjunction with the results presented by the above research, ultimately 
aims to provide practical norms suitable for the age of AI. First, in order to achieve 
this goal, we make a clear distinction between the philosophical concept of AI and 
AI robot or machine, and between various layers and categories contained in the 
concept of AI. As the AI industry develops, the frequency of using the word “artificial 
intelligence” is rapidly increasing. For example, the products we use in everyday life 
were simple home appliances many years ago, but recently they have been advertised 
as using AI technology; as the number of novels, movies, and dramas based on AI has 
grown exponentially, we no longer view such materials as new. This raises questions 
concerning the substance of AI and the conceptual prescription of its category. 
AI Ethics that falls into a broader scope of philosophical research carry out these 
conceptual studies first. This leads to a study on the rules governing the existential 
status of AI beings. The blending of such concepts as The Strong AI, Super AI, 
and General AI (Generative AI), and the discussion on the reality of the advent of 
technological Singularity may seem to be an analytical exploration of related concepts. 
However, from a broader perspective, they lead to a question on the very nature of 
AI, and further the nature of intelligence itself. In the posthuman era, with the aim of 
building AIH to elevate the value of the humanities, we establish ethical theories on 
AI to confine its use to a single tool. If the study on the definition of AI’s existential 
status is based on the philosophy of psychology and metaphysical research relevant to, 
for example, identifying the essentials of “consciousness,” the establishment of ethical 
theory focuses on AI treatment issues based on this establishment of its existential 
status. The former is concerned with developing explainable AI and the latter with 
solving the problem of the ethical vacuum caused by AI. As a result, AI ethics relates 
to the creation of practical and specific norms pertaining to AI governance. We will 
participate in the formation of sound discourse to establish a social safety net by 
presenting ethical guidelines for producers, consumers, and sellers for the use of each 
of the AI robots produced, including those specialized in health care, combat, and for 
treating those robots as pets, along with the creation of norms at a pan-ethics level, 
such as the Robot Ethics Charter. 
Finally, if we reapply the frame of “Contents and Methods” to “AIH,” in addition 
to the humanities described earlier, which takes AI as its content, the humanities 
that uses AI technology as a method will fall into that category. If the reflection 
as methodology takes “AI”(technology) for its object, the humanities that uses AI 
technology as its research method, that is, the digital humanities which contains 
humanistic content in a bowl of AI technology will be established under the 
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name of AI Data Hermeneutics.36 First, AI Data Hermeneutics will establish 
“humanity” big data, which utilizes the achievements of the digital humanities that 
are based on the computerization, analysis, and visualization of humanities data. 
As a first step, it attempts to build an emotional ontology that creates data and 
implements the patterns of human emotional expression reproduced in various 
humanities contents in a three-dimensional manner. While AI Ethics radiates 
the achievements of AIH as an integrated achievement of the AI norms, AI Data 
Hermeneutics provides a methodical basis for the systematic data set of humanistic 
content that is accessible in every research area. Second, the subject of research is 
to analyze the “modus of representation of AI in literature and art works” using 
specific digital technology and to develop a modern interpretation of humanities 
classics. Conventional humanistic research has consisted of the transitions between 
character data through such methodologies as “intuition, experience, expression, 
understanding and interpretation.” However, the results of AI Data Hermeneutics 
using such methodologies as computerization, data mining, and data visualization 
transcend the range of character data. In short, AI Data Hermeneutics consists in the 
modern interpretation of the classical literature featuring AI (which is humanistic 
data in a broad sense), the modern interpretation of humanities classics by using 
the methodology of digital humanities, and the methodological foundation for the 
aggregation of human data using digital technology to rediscover human nature in 
the age of AI.
To recapitulate, the contents of AIH are composed of AI Technology Criticism, 
AI Relationships & Communication Studies, AI Socio-Cultural Studies, and AI 
Ethics. Furthermore, its methodology comprises AI Data Hermeneutics. The four 
research areas comprising the contents of AIH have an organic structure. Tracking 
AI technology development by AI Technology Criticism and adjusting individual 
subjects’ personality and behavior patterns due to technological development will 
constitute the cornerstone for the other three research areas. In addition, while AI 
Relationships & Communication Studies involve research on AI technology and 
personality of subjects confined to language and communication, AI Socio-Cultural 
studies, paying attention to the changing patterns of collective culture in society, set 
foot in the foundation of AI Technology Criticism but form a counterpoint with it 
in research. AI Ethics collects the achievements from the above three areas of research 
to establish a philosophy that elevates human dignity in the age of AI. In its role as 
36  Many Humanists consider the Digital Humanities as a tool that engages with the traditional work of the 
humanities as a type of methodology. (See Gardiner, E. and Musto, R. (2015). The Digital Humanities, Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 3-4) As such, the content of the digital humanities comprises the subject of the 
traditional humanities, and the “methodology” is the Humanities computing equipped with digital tools. In this 
sense, we understand that artificial intelligence humanities data analysis, defined as the methodology of the study 
of humanities, implies the digital humanities. 
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a methodology for AIH, AI Data Hermeneutics uses digital technology to build its 
own academic system, simultaneously leading the research in the above four areas. 














Fig. 1. the System of AIH
5. Conclusion
We employ the methodology of separating content and form, a methodology 
unique to the traditional humanities, in order to establish the academic identity 
of a new discipline, i.e., AIH. As such, we extracted a few disciplines from the 
traditional humanities by specifying the distinction between the academic attitude 
of posthumanism and AIH, which leads to the AI-related discourse. From this, we 
deduced five research areas of AIH and described the organic structure of these 
five areas. Through this, we reorganized the traditional humanities disciplines into 
five research areas and named them “AIH” to establish a multidisciplinary and 
convergent research model focused on AI. The ultimate goal is to determine the 
function humans will perform in the age of AI and how human values should be 
defined. Amid the prospect that AI will replace most human thought and activity, 
some changes in the basic human identity have held for thousands of years, “human 
as a producer” and “working man,” have already emerged, albeit to a limited degree. 
We want to continue our research in this period of change, in which we practically 
and persuasively determine the functions humans will perform and the actions 
they should take, as well as how the process will proceed and maintain its desirable 
qualities.
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Temelj humanističke umjetne 
inteligencije
SAŽETAK
Cilj humanističke umjetne inteligencije je predstaviti humanističke prijedloge za naše živote 
i život akademske zajednice u vezi s tim kako će ljudi živjeti u pametnom gradu, okruženi 
tehnologijom umjetne inteligencije. U tu svrhu predstavljamo temelje za humanističku 
umjetnu inteligenciju i dijelimo s tim povezane zabrinutosti. Kao koncept, „humanistička 
umjetna inteligencija“ sadrži tri elementa: „umjetnu inteligenciju“, „sadržaj humanističkih 
znanosti“ i „metodologiju humanističkih znanosti“. „Sadržaj humanističkih znanosti“ 
obuhvaća derivate tradicionalnih humanističkih znanosti, naime, lingvistiku, književnost, 
povijest, etiku, sociologiju i kulturalne studije. Ovih pet područja istraživanja, zajedno s 
disciplinom stvorenom tradicionalnim prihvaćanjem promjena u humanističkim znanostima 
koje donosi doba inteligencije, proizvod su razmišljanja o sebi i svijetu, a primjenjuju se na 
svijet kakav danas postoji u doba umjetne inteligencije i humanističkih znanosti.
Ključne riječi: humanistička umjetna inteligencija, sadržaj humanističkih znanosti, 
metodologija humanističkih znanosti, posthumanizam.

